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An artificial neural network called reaCog is described which is based on a decentralized,
reactive and embodied architecture developed to control non-trivial hexapod walking in
an unpredictable environment (Walknet) while using insect-like navigation (Navinet). In
reaCog, these basic networks are extended in such a way that the complete system,
reaCog, adopts the capability of inventing new behaviors and – via internal simulation –
of planning ahead. This cognitive expansion enables the reactive system to be enriched
with additional procedures. Here, we focus on the question to what extent properties
of phenomena to be characterized on a different level of description as for example
consciousness can be found in this minimally cognitive system. Adopting a monist view,
we argue that the phenomenal aspect of mental phenomena can be neglected when
discussing the function of such a system. Under this condition, reaCog is discussed
to be equipped with properties as are bottom-up and top-down attention, intentions,
volition, and some aspects of Access Consciousness. These properties have not been
explicitly implemented but emerge from the cooperation between the elements of the
network. The aspects of Access Consciousness found in reaCog concern the above
mentioned ability to plan ahead and to invent and guide (new) actions. Furthermore, global
accessibility of memory elements, another aspect characterizing Access Consciousness
is realized by this network. reaCog allows for both reactive/automatic control and (access-)
conscious control of behavior. We discuss examples for interactions between both the
reactive domain and the conscious domain. Metacognition or Reflexive Consciousness is
not a property of reaCog. Possible expansions are discussed to allow for further properties
of Access Consciousness, verbal report on internal states, and for Metacognition. In
summary, we argue that already simple networks allow for properties of consciousness if
leaving the phenomenal aspect aside.
Keywords: recurrent neural network, consciousness, minimal cognitive system, motor control, robotic
architecture, embodiment, access consciousness, internal body model
INTRODUCTION
The nature of the mental, in particular of consciousness, and its
relation to the physical world is a fundamental concern in phi-
losophy of mind. Studies addressing this question have led to a
variety of views concerning this matter. Vision (2011) reviews
a huge number of variations and sub-variations of these views
forming a “crowded and messy field” (Vision, 2011, p. 29).
Although, as seen by somebody not being an expert in philoso-
phy of mind, most of these views appear to show a large amount
of plausibility, the various positions defended by their proponents
appear to be characterized by fundamental disagreements, and a
commonly agreed solution seems not to be in reach.
Therefore, as a complement to these top-down approaches,
in what follows we would like to begin with a quite different
approach, a bottom-up approach. The goal of this approach
is to develop a neural architecture that shows a number of
abilities found in autonomous agents, i.e., the goal is to for-
mulate quantitative hypotheses concerning the structure and
functioning of autonomous and perhaps cognitive systems that
can be tested on a robot. In this article, such a system will
be presented and used as a scaffold for discussions concern-
ing the higher-level properties usually connoted with mental
aspects. In particular we can ask to what extent properties may
be observed that have not explicitly been implemented and there-
fore may loosely be termed emergent properties. Specifically,
in this context properties are considered that may be related
to high-level properties as are attention, intention, volition, or
consciousness.
Our goal is not to construct an artificial system that is equipped
with, for example, consciousness. Instead, we want to use this
system as a tool to test to what extent descriptions of mental
phenomena used in psychology or philosophy of mind may be
applied to such an artificial system. All these definitions nec-
essarily rely on verbal formulations and are therefore open to
different interpretations. In contrast, a definition based on a
mathematical formulation or being given in the form of a quan-
titative simulation does not suffer from such ambiguities. Based
on such an explicit definition, the properties of the phenomenon
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can be studied in detail and judgments are possible whether the
specific definition chosen appears to be sufficient or whether
critical aspects of the phenomenon of interest are missing. In
the latter case, the definition may be improved accordingly. To
start with such an approach, we refer to definitions of attention
from Desimone and Duncan (1995), of intention from Pacherie
(2006) andGoschke (2013), and for volition fromGoschke (2013).
Concerningconsciousness, asdiscussedbyCleeremans (2005), this
phenomenon may only be approachable if the task is split into
different aspects that are treated separately. FollowingBlock (1995,
2001), to this endCleeremans (2005) distinguishes betweenAccess
Consciousness, Metacognition, and Phenomenal Consciousness.
To proceed in this way, in Section “reaCog, An Embodied,
Minimal Version of a Cognitive System” we will briefly and, as far
as required for a basic understanding, explain the essential prop-
erties of a system called reaCog that is supposed to be equipped
with cognitive abilities while being strongly based on a reactive
architecture (Schilling and Cruse, 2008, submitted).
Applying a bottom-up approach we focus on a reactive sys-
tem that is able to deal with a specific domain of behavior,
namely walking with six legs in an unpredictable environment
including climbing over very large gaps. The reactive part of the
system has been termed “Walknet” and is biologically inspired
by detailed work on the walking of the stick insect (Dürr et al.,
2004; Bläsing, 2006; Schilling et al., submitted a). The stepping
patterns (“gaits”) observed (in the robot as in the insects) are not
explicitly implemented but result from the cooperation of local
rules and the coupling through the environment. Furthermore,
the system has been expanded by a network allowing for insect-
like navigation (“Navinet,” Cruse and Wehner, 2011; Hoinville
et al., 2012), where the agent is able to select visiting one of a
number of food sources learned, and to decide between traveling
to the food source or back home. Of particular interest is here that
Navinet (like a desert ant) attends known visual landmarks only
in the appropriate context, i.e., depending on the food source it is
actually traveling to. Furthermore, the reactive network Navinet
does not require an explicit “cognitive map” to describe experi-
mental results, for which earlier authors have assumed such amap
to be necessary.
The complete network is based on a decentralized architec-
ture consisting of procedural, or reactive, elements which, in turn,
consist of artificial neurons. The reactive network, showing a
heterarchical structure, allows for selection of different behav-
iors, which includes protection against, in the actual context,
non-relevant sensory input.
As a next “evolutionary” step, the network is equipped with
a flexible internal body model allowing for internal simulation
of behaviors. This extended system is called reaCog, consisting
of the reactive “Walknet” which has been expanded to include
cognitive properties. Together with the introduction of this “cog-
nitive expansion,” reaCog comprises the ability to plan ahead and
to invent new behaviors in order to solve problems for which no
solution is actually available. As such, this cognitive expansion
cannot function by itself, but only, like a parasite, operates on
top of the reactive structures (Norman and Shallice, 1986). The
final decision to store a new behavioral procedure is not purely
stochastic, because the proposalsmade by the cognitive expansion
are tested for feasibility via the internal simulation as well as by
performing the behavior in reality. Thus, invention of new behav-
iors may be viewed as to be based on a Darwinian procedure (See
General Characteristics of reaCog and A Possible Expansion).
Following the definition of McFarland and Bösser (1993) a
cognitive system is characterized by the capability of planning
ahead. In this sense, reaCog can be termed a cognitive system,
that allows planning ahead via internal simulation. As the cog-
nitive system is crucially dependent on its reactive foundations
(therefore the name reaCog), the development of rich cognitive
abilities requires a correspondingly rich behavioral repertoire.
After having introduced reaCog in Section “reaCog, An
Embodied, Minimal Version of a Cognitive System,” we will,
in Section “Properties of reaCog Being Characterized by Applying
Other Levels of Description,” discuss to what extent this network,
forming a simple structure, could serve as a scaffold providing
a quantitative foundation for more abstract concepts formulated
on levels of description as being applied in psychology or phi-
losophy of mind. Specifically, we will address the phenomenon
of consciousness which, according to some authors, may be an
inherent property for at least some cognitive systems. Therefore,
although we do not want to state that consciousness should be
attributed to our system in any sense, we want to discuss in
Section “Properties of reaCog Being Characterized by Applying
Other Levels of Description” how properties characterized on dif-
ferent levelsofdescriptioncanbeobserved inourmodel. InSection
“Phenomenality” we discuss as to how phenomenal aspects might
be attributed to physical systems and conclude by arguing that the
phenomenal aspect is not crucial for understanding the function.
Wearenottryingtosolvethe“hard”problem(Chalmers,1996),but
will argue that it suffices to concentrate on the functional aspect.
InSection“Attention,Volition,Intention”wewillbrieflyaddress
the question if terms as attention, intention, or volition might
be attributed to our network. In Sections “Access Consciousness”
and “Metacognition” we will specifically address whether and how
our model maps to some of the different aspects reviewed by
Cleeremans(2005)asareAccessConsciousnessandMetacognition.
We will argue that the network studied does show some aspects
of Access Consciousness, but not of Metacognition and will
finish with Conclusions in Section “Discussion and Conclusion.”
ReaCog, AN EMBODIED, MINIMAL VERSION OF A
COGNITIVE SYSTEM
The network reaCog represents an expansion of a neural net-
work based controller called Walknet which has been derived as
a hypothesis to describe a large number of behavioral studies
performed with stick insects (Dürr et al., 2004; Schilling et al.,
submitted a).
The controller has to deal with a body containing 22 degrees
of freedom (DoF), 3 DoF for each of the six legs and 4 DoF allow
for movements along the body axis. As body position in space
is defined by only 6 DoFs (three for position in space, three for
orientation) there are 16 DoFs free to be decided upon. The con-
troller consists of a decentralized architecture, first of all six more
or less independent controllers, one for each leg. The controllers
of neighboring legs are coupled via a small number of channels
transmitting information concerning the actual state of that leg
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition June 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 324 | 2
Cruse and Schilling Consciousness in a minimal cognitive system
(e.g., swing, stance) or its position, i.e., values of joint angles
(Figure 1). The architecture of the leg controller is depicted in
Figure 2, lower part, black boxes. Only two leg controllers are
shown. The single leg controller consists of several procedures
that are realized by artificial neurons forming a local, in general,
FIGURE 1 | Schema showing the robot Hector and the morphological
arrangement of the leg controllers and the coordination influences
(1–6) between legs. Legs are marked by L for left legs and R for right legs
and numbered from 1 to 3 for front, middle and hind legs, respectively.
recurrent neural network (RNN). These procedural elements, or
modules, might receive direct sensory input and provide output
signals that can be used for driving motor elements. But other
modules may also provide input to a module. All these networks
may be considered to form elements of the procedural memory.
The two most important procedural elements in our example
are the Swing-net, responsible for controlling a swing movement,
and the Stance-net controlling a stance movement. In addition,
each leg possesses a so-called Target_fw-net for forward walk-
ing and Target_bw-net for backward walking, both influencing
Swing-net.
To allow the system to select autonomously between differ-
ent behaviors as for instance standing and walking, or forward
and backward walking, reaCog is expanded by introduction of a
RNN consisting of so-called motivation units (Figure 2, marked
in red). The function of a motivation unit as applied here is
to control to what extent the corresponding procedural element
contributes to the behavior. To this end, these units influence
the strength of the output of its procedure network (in a mul-
tiplicative way). As illustrated in Figure 2, motivation units can
also be used to influence other motivation units via excitatory or
inhibitory connections. For example, units which belong to the
procedural nets controlling the six legs (only two legs are depicted
in Figure 2) show mutual positive connections to a unit termed
“walk” in Figure 2. This unit serves the function of arousing all
units possibly required when the behavior walk is activated.
FIGURE 2 | A section of Walknet showing two leg controllers.
Each consists of a Stance-net and a Swing-net, the latter being
connected with a Target-net (Targetfw). The motor output acts on
the legs (box muscles/body/environment). Sensory feedback is used
by the motor procedures as well as to switch between the states
(red units connected by mutual inhibition). r1 represents coordination
rule 1 (see Figure 1). Furthermore, the network is equipped with
further procedures (Target_bw-net), a body model (blue) and a
motivation unit network (red). The body is represented by the
boxes “leg.”
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In addition, we introduce units “forward” and “backward” to
activate procedures required for forward or backward walking
(Figure 2, fw, bw), respectively, by selecting specific Target-nets.
Bothunits“fw”and“bw”aremutuallycoupledwiththemotivation
unit “walk.” Only indicated in this figure is that the unit “walk”
may be coupled via mutual inhibition to other units that stand for
different behaviors like, for example, standing still (unit “stand”).
The corresponding procedures are, however, not depicted. It is
also not shown that these “higher-level” motivation units may
receive direct or indirect input from sensory units that influ-
ence the activation of a motivation unit. In Figure 2 this is only
shown for the “lower-level” motivation units of Swing-net and
Stance-net (for example, a ground contact sensor of a leg being
stimulatedmayactivate themotivationunitof thestanceprocedure
of this leg). Also, the complete motivation unit network used for
controlling navigation is not shown (see Hoinville et al., 2012).
As illustrated in Figure 2, this at first glance hierarchical struc-
ture of the motivation unit network is in general not forming a
simple, tree-like arborization. As indicated by the bi-directional
connections, motivation units form a RNN coupled by positive
(arrowheads) and negative (T-shaped connections) influences
(for details concerning the weights used see Schilling et al., sub-
mitted b). This structure may therefore be better described as
“heterarchical.” Some of these motivation units are coupled by
local winner-take-all connections. This is true for the Swing-net
and Stance-net of each leg, as well as for the motivation units
for forward and backward walking. Thereby, a selection of one
of the available Target-nets is possible. Excitatory connections
between motivation units allow for building coalitions. As can
be derived from Figure 2, there are different overlapping ensem-
bles possible. For example, all “leg” units and the unit “walk” are
activated during backward walking and during forward walking,
but only one of the two units termed “fw” (forward) and “bw”
(backward) and only some of the targeting modules are active
in either case. In this way, through the combination of excitatory
and inhibitory connections this architecture can produce various
stable attractor states or “internal states.” Such a state protects
the system from responding to inappropriate sensory input. For
instance, as a lower-level example, depending on whether a leg
is in swing state or in stance state, a given sensory input can be
treated differently. Correspondingly, internal states can be distin-
guished on higher-levels, as for example walking, standing still, or
feeding (for further details see Schilling et al., submitted a,b).
BODY MODEL
A further important element of reaCog concerns the representa-
tion of a body model. This body model is realized by a specific
RNN (Schilling, 2011) and has by itself a modular structure
(Schilling and Cruse, 2007; Schilling et al., 2012). It consists of
six networks each representing one leg. These modules are con-
nected on a higher-level forming a seventh network representing
the whole body. The latter network represents the central body
and the legs in an only abstracted form. In Figure 2 the elements
of the body model are marked in b1lue. Thus, the body model is
represented by a modular structure which, as it is constructed as a
RNN, at the same time comprises a holistic system [Figure 3, for
details concerning the body model see (Schilling, 2011; Schilling
and Cruse, 2012)].
In normal walking, i.e., still in the reactive mode, the body
model is used in forward and backward walking as well as in
negotiating curves and provides joint control signals to the cor-
responding Stance-net. As the model mirrors the 22 DoF of the
insect body the task is underdetermined. Therefore, calculation
of the joint control signals is still a hard problem and a unique
solution is not directly computable (Schilling and Cruse, 2012).
As a solution, we apply the idea of the passive motion paradigm
to this problem (von Kleist, 1810; Mussa Ivaldi et al., 1988;
Loeb, 2001). Like a simulated marionette puppet (Figure 3), the
internally simulated body is pulled by its head in the direction
of desired body movement (Figure 3B, delta_0), provided, for
example, by a vector based on sensory input from the anten-
nae or, if available, by visual or acoustic input (Figure 2, sensory
FIGURE 3 | (A) Illustrates how the body model is attached to the body of robot Hector. (B) shows the abstracted body model. Vectors delta_0 and delta_back
can pull the model in forward or backward direction, respectively. On the right, an example is shown how a leg network is connected to the abstracted/central
body model.
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input). As a consequence, the stance legs of the puppet move in
an appropriate way. The changes of the simulated joint angles can
be used as motor commands to control the actual joints. To con-
trol backward walking, the body model is pulled by the vector
delta_back (Figure 3B) at the bottom. If such a body model is
given that represents the kinematical constraints of the real body,
we obtain in this way an easy solution of the inverse kinematic
problem, i.e., a solution for the question how the joints of legs
standing on the ground have to be moved in concert to propel the
body.
The body model also receives sensory data. Due to its holistic
structure the body model integrates redundant sensory infor-
mation and is able to correct possible errors in the sensor data
(Schilling and Cruse, 2012). As will be sketched below, due to its
ability of pattern completion, this model can also be used as a
forward model. Therefore, the model allows for prediction, too,
a property that can be exploited when dealing with the ability to
plan ahead.
PLANNING AHEAD
The network, as described, consists of a “hard-wired” struc-
ture, i.e., the weights connecting the artificial neurons are fixed.
Nevertheless, the system is able to flexibly adapt to properties of
the environment, as for example deal with various disturbances
and climb over large gaps (Bläsing, 2006). However, situations
may occur in which the controller runs into a deadlock. Think
for example of the situation in which, during forward walking, by
chance all legs but the right hind leg are positioned in the frontal
part of their corresponding range of movement, whilst the right
hind leg is positioned very far to the rear. When this leg starts
a swing movement, the body may fall backward as the center of
gravity is not anymore supported by the legs on the ground. Such
a “problem” might be signaled by specific sensory input, a “prob-
lem detector.” In our case, this could, for example, be a system
reacting to a specific load distribution of the legs. To find a way
out of this deadlock, a random selection of a behavioral module
not belonging to the actual context could provide help. A possible
solution in this case might be a backward step of the right middle
leg. Such a backward step of the middle leg wouldmake it possible
to support the body, then allowing the hind leg to start a swing.
However, in our controller, backward steps are only permitted in
the context of backward walking. How might it still be possible
for the system to find such a solution?
Figure 4 illustrates a simple expansion allowing the system
to search for such a solution. As we will argue later, we name
this expansion “attention controller.” A third layer (Figure 4,
FIGURE 4 | Schema of reaCog, consisting of Walknet as depicted in Figure 2, with a body model (blue) and a motivation unit network (red), but now
expanded by a further layer (WTA, marked green, not all connections are depicted). The body is represented by the boxes “leg.”
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green units), essentially consisting of a recurrent winner-take-all
network (WTA-net) 1 is arranged in such a way that each moti-
vation unit has a partner unit in the WTA-net. Motivation units
already activated in the actual context inhibit their WTA part-
ner unit (T-shaped connections in Figure 4). Thus, a random
activation of the WTA-net will, after relaxation, find a unit not
belonging to the currently activated modules. TheWTA unit win-
ning the competition can then be used to activate its partner
motivation unit and thereby trigger a new behavior that can be
tested for being able to solve the problem. In this way, the network
has the capability of following a trial-and-error strategy.
As has been proposed (Schilling and Cruse, 2008) a further
expansion of the system may permit to use the body model
instead of the real body to test the new behavior via “inter-
nal trial-and-error” whilst the motor output to the real body is
switched off. To this end, switches have to be introduced allowing
the motor output signals to circumvent the real body and being
passed directly to the body model (Figure 4, switch SW). Only if
the internal simulation has shown that the new trial provides a
solution to the problem, the behavior will actually be executed.
McFarland and Bösser (1993) define a cognitive system in the
strict sense as a system that is able to plan ahead, i.e., to perform
internal simulations to predict the possible outcome of a behavior.
Therefore, the latter expansion would, according to McFarland
and Bösser, make the system a cognitive one (for details see Cruse
and Schilling, 2010; Schilling and Cruse, submitted).
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF ReaCog AND A POSSIBLE EXPANSION
To sum up, the neural controller Walknet, as described earlier
(e.g., Dürr et al., 2004; Schilling et al., submitted a), represents a
typical case of an embodied controller (first-order embodiment,
cf. Metzinger, 2006, forthcoming): the network is able to con-
trol the movement of a hexapod walker in unpredictably varying
environments without relying on other information than avail-
able using the given mechanosensors. This is possible because the
body and properties of the environment are crucial elements of
the computational system – the system is embodied not only in
the sense that there is a physical body (e.g., that there are inter-
nal states being physically represented), but also in the sense that
the properties of the body (e.g., its geometry) are required for
computational purposes. Exploiting the loop through the world
(including the own body) allows for a dramatic simplification of
the computation. These properties can also be attributed to the
expanded version, reaCog. In this system, being expanded by an
internal body model, control of DoFs does not result from explicit
specification by the neuronal controller, but results from a combi-
nation/cooperation of the neuronal controller, the internal body
model and the coupling via the environment. Furthermore, the
body model is used for planning ahead. Such a network, accord-
ing to Metzinger (2006, forthcoming), represents a system being
characterized by second-order embodiment.
The procedures forming the decentralized controller are basi-
cally arranged in parallel, i.e., obtain sensory input and provide
1In a recurrent winner-take-all network, each unit receives positive feedback
from itself and negative feedback from all other units of the network.When any
random activation is given to these units, after some iterations one unit will
show a positive activation and all other units will show an activation of zero.
motor output, but there are also procedures that receive input
from other procedures and, as a consequence, procedures that
provide output to other procedures.
The artificial neural network reaCog shows automatic behav-
ior and action selection on the reactive level, where several of
these procedures can be performed in parallel, but also shows
control of behavior on the cognitive level, as the decisions based
on imagined action (probehandeln) are not determined strictly
by the sensorily given situation. This is the case because due to
the noise active in the attention controller, there is a stochas-
tic effect. The final decision is, however, not purely stochastic,
because the proposals made by the attention controller are tested
for feasibility via the internal simulation. Before being stored in
long term memory, the proposal is further tested by performing
the behavior in reality. In this way, this decision may be viewed
as to be based on a Darwinian procedure, starting with an, in
part, stochastic “mutation,” followed by an, in our case twofold,
selection testing the proposal for “fitness.”
Furthermore, inspired by Steels (2007); Steels and Belpaeme
(2005), the network may be expanded by a forth layer (not
depicted in Figure 4), that contains specific procedures, namely
networks that represent verbal expressions. These “word-nets”
may likewise be used to utter or to comprehend the word stored.
The underlying idea is to connect each word-net with a unit of
the motivation network of which it carries the meaning (e.g., the
word-net “walk” should be connected with the motivation unit
walk), thereby grounding the symbolic expression (Cruse, 2010).
Although the latter two levels (WTA-net and word-nets) are still
quite speculative as they have not yet been tested, together with
the two lower layers they illustrate the principal idea of this archi-
tecture (Figure 5). Horizontally arranged modules (procedures,
motivation units, WTA neurons, and procedures for words), are
ordered in the horizontal layers in such a way that the correspond-
ing elements in the different layers appear in a vertical order,
leading to modules arranged in a columnar fashion (Figure 5,
dashed rectangles). Addressing this columnar structure does not
mean that each lower-level procedure or each motivation unit has
to have a partner in the upper layers, but only means that such
connections are in principle possible. Similarly, not every unit or
procedure in the upper layers necessarily has a partner procedure
in the lowest layer.
FIGURE 5 | Schematic showing the horizontal and columnar
arrangement of the modules used by the architecture proposed.
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PROPERTIES OF ReaCog BEING CHARACTERIZED BY
APPLYING OTHER LEVELS OF DESCRIPTION
Having available a quantitatively defined network that is able to
control specific behaviors of an agent, we will now ask to what
extent reaCog is able to realize properties that were not explicitly
implemented. For example, as has been noted earlier (Schilling
et al., 2008, submitted a), when applying descriptions used in
the behavioral domain, a term like tripod gait is sensibly used to
describe the walking behavior of a hexapod, although no explicit
tripod gait controller, for instance, is implemented in reaCog
(different to many other hexapod controllers). Instead, at the
neuronal/computational level only local rules are used to couple
neighboring legs, which allows for different walking patterns to
appear, depending on the control parameter “velocity.”
In the following, we will particularly concentrate on concepts
usually applied in domains other than computer science and
behavioral biology, as are psychology and philosophy of mind.
Adopting other levels of description may not only be feasible
to better understand the properties of our system on a more
abstract level, but may also help to find more operational def-
initions for concepts used in the other disciplines. Underlying
such an approach is the assumption that most, if not all of these
phenomena arise as emergent properties (Vision, 2011) and that
they can only be observed and characterized when higher-levels
of description are applied.
Whereas some authors speculate that phenomena as for
instance consciousness can only be attributed to human beings
or possibly monkeys, other authors claim that consciousness may
come in various degrees and may, to a smaller degree, already
occur in lower-level animals (Dennett, 1991). This view is sup-
ported by the observation that already small-scale networks might
allow for interesting cognitive properties (Herzog et al., 2007;
Menzel et al., 2007). Due to its evolutionary plausibility we tend
to the latter assumption, and therefore raise the question to what
extent any aspects of consciousness could be attributed to the
network discussed here although, when designing the network,
we did not aim to “implement consciousness” at all. To the
extent such attributions would be possible, questions concern-
ing the possible function of consciousness, for example as to how
consciousness might contribute to action, i.e., to the control of
behavior, might be addressable.
We would like to stress that, in pursuing this question, we are
not trying to state what consciousness is, i.e., we do not want to
“explain consciousness.” We also do not assume that the categories
introduced by the different authors referred to represent the ulti-
mate solution to approach the problem. Instead, we would like to
connect aspects of this complex issue, as have been addressed by
different authors, with our simulation approach. This furthermeans
that the collection of properties characterizing a system as being
conscious will not be discussed in a rigorous way with respect to
being necessary or sufficient for a system being a conscious one.
Rather, we will only compare the categories discussed by different
authors with our approach. A rigorous definition might only be
sensible at a later stage (see also Holland and Goodman, 2003).
To this end, we will begin by following a categorization proposed
by Block (1995, 2001) and being placed in a broader framework by
Cleeremans (2005). Cleeremans reviewed an impressive number of
philosophical statements concerning consciousness. In spite of con-
siderable disagreement between authors in detail (see also Vision,
2011), Cleeremans reported an interesting overlap with respect
to the essential properties characterizing possible computational
correlates of consciousness. According to this review, phenomena
concerning consciousness may be grouped along three domains,
termed Phenomenal Consciousness, Access Consciousness, and
Metacognition (or Reflexive Consciousness). Concerning the phe-
nomenal aspect of consciousness, some philosophers consider this
aspect as a separate domain, being independent of Metacognition
and Access Consciousness, whereas other philosophers consider
phenomenality as a property not being separable, but being directly
connected with Metacognition and Access Consciousness. Again,
other philosophers are only prepared to attribute consciousness to
systems showing Reflexive Consciousness (e.g., Rosenthal, 2002).
As mentioned, we will not enter this discussion. For our pur-
pose it is not critical which of the different taxonomies is better
suited to characterize the phenomenon of consciousness. We
selected one, Block’s taxonomy, as a scaffold to compare the dif-
ferent phenomena described in the literature with properties of
our network.
PHENOMENALITY
What is meant by phenomenal consciousness or the phenomenal
aspect of consciousness, sometimes also termed internal per-
spective or subjective experience? The characteristic of subjective
experience may be particularly obvious in the case of pain. We
might, as a thought experiment, monitor all neuronal activities
of a (human) subject that result when his/her skin is stimu-
lated by a needle. One might, in principle even examine one’s
own action potentials, if oneself is the subject of this experi-
ment. In such an experiment, everybody including the subject
him/herself could have a look at the data, but the experience
when regarding all these neuronal activities monitored is com-
pletely different from the pain one is experiencing at this moment.
The content of this subjective experience is only accessible to the
person herself or himself. Nobody other than myself can judge
how I feel the pain. Thus, self-observation tells us that there are
systems, namely humans, that can experience an internal per-
spective. On the other hand, intuition tells us that there are
other systems, like a stone or a simple machine (including some
clever present-day robots) that may not have such an internal
perspective.
In many cases, consider for example an animal like an insect,
we cannot decide whether it belongs to systems that act like a
reflex machine, or a clockwork, not being able to experience an
internal perspective, or whether it belongs to the second type, and
consequently is able to have subjective experience.
But also within the human brain there are sections that belong
to one of both states and that may even be able to switch between
both states. In (dreamless) sleep or under anesthesia neuronal sys-
tems are still active but subjective experience is “switched off.” But
also when in normal awake state, we are not aware of the contents
of all the different neuronal activities taking place in our brain.
Rather, at a given moment we consciously attend, and therefore
subjectively experience, only one aspect andmay later switch con-
scious attention to another one. Therefore, we have to assume that
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subjective experiences arise only if specific, yet unknown, types of
neuronal activities are given.
Up to now we have only indirect evidence concerning the con-
ditions required for subjective experience to arise. In an early
experiment, Libet et al. (1964) performing direct electrical stimu-
lation of the cortex found that a stimulus required a minimum of
500ms to lead to a reportable experience. More generally, accord-
ing to Bloch’s law (Bloch, 1885), the subjectively experienced
strength of a stimulus depends on the mathematical product of
stimulus duration and stimulus intensity. This means, in other
words, that the temporal integral over stimulus intensity has to
reach a given threshold to become subjectively experienced.
In more recent experiments, activation of different procedures
have been studied which compete for becoming subjectively expe-
rienced. For example, Ansorge et al. (1998) performed masking
experiments, where participants first learned to press a button
when a circle was presented on a screen, but not when a square
was shown. After learning is finished, in the critical experiment
the circle was given for a short period (about 30ms) which was
then followed by a longer presentation of the square. The partic-
ipants reported to have only seen the square. Nonetheless, they
pressed the button. This result can be interpreted in such a way
that the procedure, “stimulus circle-motor response” can be exe-
cuted without being accompanied by subjective experience of
the circle. The second procedure, “stimulus square – no motor
response” apparently influences the first procedure by inhibiting
the process leading to subjective experience. This is interpreted
in the following way: each procedure shows a temporal dynam-
ics similar to that of a low-pass filter 2. The motor command of
a procedure can already be elicited after a smaller threshold has
been reached, whereas a larger threshold is required to reach the
state of subjective experience. Only in the latter state the proce-
dure can inhibit other, competing procedures to reach the state
of subjective experience. In other words, procedures appear to
be connected via a WTA network, where the inhibitory connec-
tions are only active when the procedural network has reached the
(higher) threshold characterizing the state of subjective experi-
ence. Therefore, in the masking experiment the second procedure
is not inhibited by the first one, which allows the square to become
subjectively experienced.
These results lead us to the following view. There are specific
neuronal states that require time to be developed. The basic func-
tion of the neural system, namely triggering the output signal
(e.g., a motor command) can be performed without phenomenal
experience, but at least some procedures may in addition be able
to reach the latter state. After the neural network has reached this
state, additional functions may arise, one, as mentioned, being
to inhibit other procedures to reach this state. Other functions
might be to allow the winning procedure to access more neuronal
sources, and perhaps to allow faster storing of new information
(e.g., for one-shot learning).
2A low-pass filter is characterized by an increase of output activation that,
when excited by a constant stimulus, asymptotically approaches a given out-
put value. Such low-pass filter dynamics are for example given by RNN with
attractor properties. In this case, the so-called harmony value (Rumelhart and
McClelland, 1986) of the network can be used to characterize its state.
It would of course be extremely interesting to understand in
detail the conditions that are necessary and sufficient for a neu-
ronal network to reach the state being accompanied by subjective
experience. At this time merely pure speculations are possible
concerning the character of such neuronal activities although
impressive progress has been made in recent years (see review
Schier, 2009; Dehaene and Changeux, 2011). Continuation of
these research projects by combining neurophysiological with
behavioral studies may lead to a better understanding of the phys-
iological properties and functions of this state. But even if this was
the case at some future time, we would not understand why this
state is accompanied by the phenomenal aspect.
The results mentioned above support a non-dualist, or monist,
view, which means that there are no separate domains, the men-
tal and the physical domain in the sense that there are causal
influences from one domain to the other one as postulated by
substance dualism. Rather, both “domains” appear to be different
aspects of the same underlying phenomenon. We just deal with
different levels of description3.
Adopting a monist view allows us to concentrate on the
functional aspects when comparing systems endowed with the
phenomenal aspect, i.e., human beings, with animals or artifi-
cial systems. According to this view, phenomenality is considered
a property being directly connected with specific functions of
the network. This means that mental phenomena that are char-
acterized by phenomenal content as are, for example, attention,
intention, volition, emotion, and consciousness, can be treated by
concentrating on the aspect of information processing (Neisser,
1967). In particular with respect to Phenomenal Consciousness,
Access Consciousness, and Metacognition, this view has con-
vincingly been supported by Kouider et al. (2010) as well as, in
a recent review, by Cohen and Dennett (2011). Therefore, we
will compare properties of reaCog with current definitions found
in the literature concerning those phenomena. In doing so, we
have however to be aware of the possibility that important func-
tional properties may not yet be taken into account by these
definitions.
Following the monist view, the question as to how it is possible
that a physical system is accompanied by subjective experiences,
termed the “hard problem” by Chalmers (1996), can remain open
and we may yet be able to understand the functional aspects of
consciousness. A further consequence would be that even an arti-
ficial system would have some kind of subjective experience, if
only the appropriate (yet unknown) neural dynamics were imple-
mented (for ethical problems connected with this matter see
Metzinger, 2009). On the other hand, it might be possible that
systems exist where the functional aspects currently attributed to
consciousness are given although these systems are not accompa-
nied with phenomenality, because the networks show the func-
tions of phenomena as listed in the following sections but do
not show the neural dynamics required for phenomenality. In
the following, we will first address briefly attention, volition and
intention, and then deal with consciousness.
3There are various views adopting a monist approach differing in detail
(epiphenomenalism, emergentism, property dualism and their many deriva-
tives, see Vision, 2011). We will not take part in this discussion here.
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ATTENTION, VOLITION, INTENTION
Can we find properties corresponding to attention in reaCog?
Attention concerns how perception is selected by bottom-up, i.e.,
sensory driven influences, or by top-down influences (Desimone
and Duncan, 1995). The latter may depend on familiarity with
the stimulus, or on internal (e.g., emotional) states. Concerning
reaCog, there are, indeed, several cases to be observed.
The motivation unit network is especially designed to allow
for competitions on different levels, in this way forming differ-
ent clusters, or coalitions, of units. For example, the competition
on a leg level selects between swing and stance movements.
Stimulation by the ground contact sensor, for instance, changes
the internal state from swing to stance. Activating the unit Stance
means that sensory input relevant for stance, but not inputs rele-
vant for swing can be perceived. Therefore, this case corresponds
to bottom-up attention control.
On a more global level, behaviors different from walking or,
within the context of walking, the direction on forward or back-
ward, can be selected. Activation of these motivation units not
only allows for selection of behavioral elements, but also provides
a broader context according to which specific sensory inputs may
be selected or not. In this sense, the motivation unit network can
be considered to be a system allowing for top-down attention con-
trol. In the case of Navinet, for example, visual signals are only
considered when they belong to the currently activated context
defined by looking for a specific food source. The context might
be changed when the food source is found to be empty.
Introduction of the cognitive expansion enables reaCog to invent
new behaviors and to test them via internal simulation before
executing them. In this layer, the WTA units of the cognitive
expansion are arranged in accord with the motivation units in the
lower layer. As this expansion of the reactive network allows the
complete system, using psychological terms to describe its function,
to “focus” or “concentrate” or “attend” on a specific behavior, we
may also call this expansion an “attention controller4.”
This system represents a special type of top-down attention
being used to select new procedures, normally not used in the cur-
rent context. The decision to execute a new behavior as controlled
by the attention controller will be called a cognitive decision in
the following. This focusing mechanism may correspond to what
sometimes has been termed “spot light” (Baars and Franklin,
2007). Thus, three types of attentional influences can be observed
in reaCog. If the procedures controlled by the motivation units
are equipped with the still unknown neural dynamics required for
phenomenality, their content could reach the state of subjective
experience.
Volition is a summary term denoting mechanisms allowing
for voluntary actions. The latter are “actions that are not fully
determined by the immediate stimulus situation but depend on
mental representations of intended goals and anticipated effects”
(Goschke, 2013). In other words, the behavior of the agent cannot
be predicted by an external observer. Cognitive decisions made
by reaCog are indeed based on anticipated effect using internal
4Using a WTA network this way has been termed biased competition (see
e.g. Bundesen et al., 2011.
simulation and they follow a goal, as they aim to solve the prob-
lem at hand. These decisions contain a stochastic element, but are
not arbitrary because the proposed behavior is tested via inter-
nal simulation for feasibility before being executed and because
the architecture of the WTA-net being connected to the body
already represents a heuristic based on some kind of topologi-
cal map (solutions near the morphological site of the problem
are supported). Therefore, volition may be attributed to an agent
controlled by reaCog, whereby, as above, the phenomenal aspect
depends on the unknown conditions concerning the required
neural dynamics.
Similarly, an agent controlled by reaCog might be attributed
the capability of showing intentions. An action is controlled by
intention if it is goal-directed. Pacherie (2006) referring to Bratman
(1987) distinguishes between different types of intentions based
on the temporal characteristics: future-directed intentions and
present-directed intentions. Pacherie (2006) adds a third type,
called motor-intentions. The latter two are characterized as to
guide either “higher-level” functions or “lower-lever” functions,
respectively. According to Pacherie (2006), present-directed inten-
tions, in contrast to motor-intentions, are considered as under
“conscious” control or “rational” control. In our framework, we
interpret this in such away thatmotor-intentions act on the reactive
level, whereas present-directed intentions require cognitive deci-
sions. Future-directed intentions concerning long term planning
are not considered here. In any case, the basic underlying control
structure is given by a feedback controller and/or by a feedforward
controller containing explicit or implicit representations of the
goal. However, the actual behavior may require a network for the
control of many more parameters including temporal aspects s is
the case in reaCog. According to Goschke (2013), intentions are
“causal preconditions explainingwhy a particular stimulus triggers
a particular action (rather than a different action)” (Goschke, 2013,
p. 415) In other words, “intentions can be said to shape the “attrac-
tor landscape” of an agent’s behavioral state space” (Kugler et al.,
1990, ref. fromGoschke, 2013, p. 415). Indeed, themotivation unit
network is able to form such attractor states, for example, when
in Navinet the agent has decided to visit a specific food source
or the nest. Depending on the actual goal, the relevant behavior
will be executed while specific sensory stimuli are attended or not.
Therefore, the agent may be called to be endowed with intentions.
ACCESS CONSCIOUSNESS
As mentioned earlier, our approach is not to start with theoret-
ical concepts of consciousness (or attention) and then construct
a network that is endowed with properties of consciousness. In
contrast, our goal is to construct a network that, based on a reactive
network, is able to control non-trivial reactive behavior, and shows
cognitive abilities, i.e., is able to invent new solutions for a problem
and to plan ahead. Only after having such a system available, we
ask whether it may also be attributed with properties related with
consciousness. Specifically, as we abstract from the phenomenal
aspect, we will refer to Access Consciousness and Metacognition.
To begin with, we will focus on the question whether, in
reaCog, we would find properties of Access Consciousness. This
question would be of interest even if some authors would be cor-
rect who argue that consciousness in the strict sense can only arise
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in systems showing the faculty of Metacognition (e.g., Lau and
Rosenthal, 2011, for a recent review defending this view).
The essential properties of Access Consciousness (e.g.,
Cleeremans, 2005) refer to the ability of a system to plan and guide
actions, to report verbally on the content of the corresponding repre-
sentations and to reason. In contrast, non-conscious representations
cannot be used this way. As discussed in Section “Planning Ahead,”
planning ahead and guiding actions are indeed central properties
of reaCog. An agent equipped with reaCog is able to, first, test
a new idea by internal simulation (“probehandeln”), which will,
when the test has been successful, then be used to guide the newly
invented behavior. Concerning the third issue of Cleeremans’s list,
verbal report, we only briefly sketched here how reaCog may be
equipped with the property to deal with (verbal) symbols allowing
the agent to report on internal states and comprehend heard ver-
bal expressions (Cruse, 2010). Steels (2007), Steels and Belpaeme
(2005), and Narayanan (1997) have however studied inmuch detail
how these properties may be incorporated in a network being based
on reactive structures. Thus, at least in principle, reaCog could
realize this property, too. Only the last issue from this list describing
properties of Access Consciousness, symbolic reasoning, is clearly
not addressed by reaCog.
Related work
To illustrate in more detail to what extent reaCog shows prop-
erties of Access Consciousness, we compare reaCog with other
related approaches. Dehaene and Changeux (2011) review the
relevant models of networks that are supposed to simulate
consciousness, including their own approach “global neural
workspace” (GNW) (see also Seth, 2007 for a systematic sum-
mary). Of all models discussed by Dehaene and Changeux, GNW
shows the largest overlap with reaCog. Therefore, in the following
we will focus on a comparison with this approach.
Following the ideas of Baars and colleagues (e.g., Baars, 1988;
Baars and Franklin, 2007), who, starting with an abstract con-
ceptual approach, have developed the “global workspace” theory,
Dehaene and Changeux continued these ideas developing a neural
implementation of the GNW. Coarsely, this model consists of two
parts, a number of specialized, automatic processes, considered
non-conscious, and a second, upper-level part, to which proper-
ties of consciousness are attributed. The function of this “router”
is to connect sensory and motor representations by variably con-
necting different automatic processes. Thereby, this “router” is
responsible for amplifying and maintaining specific neural repre-
sentations, making them consciously accessible. Due to the long
distance connections the content of these representations can be
globally “broadcasted” to many other processes in the brain.
Let us begin to address the basic differences between the
GNWmodel and reaCog. The first one concerns the architectural
details, in particular the granularity of the models. GNWoperates
with a large number of spiking neurons (two orders of magnitude
more neurons than reaCog) simulating in detail membrane prop-
erties, ion channels and receptor potentials, like AMPA or NMDA
receptors. In reaCog only very simple, piecewise linear, weighted
summation units are used.
The GNW model consists of several layers connected via
bottom-up and top-down channels. Elements of the uppermost
layer are connected via mutual inhibition which leads to a com-
petition between these elements (like in a WTA-net). A weak
and/or short stimulus given to the lowest, input, layer elicits a
short, decaying excitation of the upper layers. A strong and/or
long stimulus may activate the top-down connections in such a
way that long reverberating activity will occur showing long range
synchronous oscillations. The former case is compared with non-
conscious activity, the latter with conscious activity (In humans
the latter is paralleled by specific oscillations in the gamma band
and also marked by positive waves in event-related potentials,
Dehaene and Changeux, 2011). As the elements of the upper-
most layer, the “router,” compete with each other, only one of
these elements can be active (and reach the conscious state) at a
given moment of time, whereas weaker stimulation may activate
several lower-level elements in parallel, maintaining them in the
non-conscious state.
In reaCog, we have only one layer of procedures the activity of
which could realize different internal states. These states correspond
to different contexts that can control the automatic, non-conscious
behaviors. If a problem occurs, the attention controller selects and
activates specific lower-level procedures by activating the corre-
sponding motivation units which may form coalitions. Like in the
upper layer of GNW, there is a competition based on lateral inhi-
bition represented by the “attention controller,” i.e., essentially the
WTA-net. Thus, bothmodels allow for serial (all ornone) processing
at this level. The event-related potentials, in humans paralleled with
the occurrence of subjective experience, could by both approaches
be explained by the strong activation of the inhibitory signals used
for competition in the uppermost layer of the GNWmodel and the
WTA-net in reaCog. Both models further agree with the require-
ment (Cleeremans, 2005) that in order to reach Consciousness a
high strength of activation is needed to win the WTA competition.
Furthermore, some time is required as in bothmodels several itera-
tionsarenecessaryuntil auniquedecisionhasbeenmade.Therefore,
access to these attended elements, represented by the upper layer
in the GNW model or the WTA units of the attention controller
in reaCog, is slower than the reactive or “automatic” activation of
a module remaining in unattended state. An essential difference
between both approaches is that, in reaCog, this WTA-net does not
contribute to the phenomenal state directly, but only selects those
procedures that may become conscious. In reaCog, phenomenal
experience, if given at all, is accompanied with the corresponding
activation of the procedures.
Beside the difference with respect to granularity, the second
crucial difference concerns the tasks to be dealt with. The task of
the reactive part of reaCog is to control a complex body with 22
DoF – most of which concern redundant DoFs – able to walk over
irregular surfaces including very large gaps (up to twice the size of
a normal step length) as well as dealing with complex navigation
tasks including path integration and landmark navigation. This is
different from the GNW approach. A recent implementation of
the GNW model, merging elements that have earlier been studied
separately, is given by Zylberberg et al. (2011). The GNW model
is equipped with the above mentioned complex internal neuronal
structure forming a realistic simulation of mammalian brain prop-
erties. As input, simulated visual or auditory signals are applied
whereas motor outputs are represented by simple go-nogo signals.
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As studied by Zylberberg et al. (2011), the GNW model concen-
trates on dual-task inferences, i.e., the inability of human subjects
to deal with two tasks, T1 and T2, at the same time. In one type of
experiments, studying the psychological refractory period (PRP),
first a stimulus S1 is given, that triggers a task T1. Then a sec-
ond stimulus, S2, triggering another task, T2, is provided. If S2
is presented before T1 has been finished, the execution of T2 is
delayed until the first task is finished. In another type, the atten-
tional blink experiment, a stimulus does not become consciously
aware if it follows another stimulus too closely. In some mask-
ing experiments, the first stimulus is responded to although the
person did not become aware of the appearance of this stimulus
(e.g., Ansorge et al., 1998). The model of Zylberberg et al. (2011) is
able to agree in quantitative detail with many experimental results.
Generally, these effects can be interpreted as basic properties of
a WTA network with hysteresis properties, the effects depending
on the time delay, the strength, and the duration of the stimuli.
Therefore qualitatively they could also be found in a network like
reaCog. However, no comparable quantitative simulation is possi-
ble due to the different granularity. Likewise, no statements can
be drawn from reaCog simulations which are comparable with
the interesting insights (Zylberberg et al., 2011) concerning the
possible properties of oscillatory states.
As reaCog is not equipped with spiking neurons, no long
distance phase synchrony can be observed. These events are some-
times assumed as to form the neural correlates of consciousness.
As an alternative, they may, however, as such, be mere “technical”
requirements necessary for binding of spatially distributed neural
elements, a function that in reaCog is represented by selection of
the appropriate motivation units.
Global accessibility
A notion tightly related to the above mentioned term “GNW,”
(e.g., Dehaene and Changeux, 2011), the term “unified neu-
ral workspace” (Dehaene and Naccache, 2001), and “global
workspace” (Baars and Franklin, 2007), all postulated to char-
acterize a prerequisite of conscious representations, concerns
the latter as being “globally accessible” or “globally available”
(Cleeremans, 2005). This means that many (but probably not all)
of the representations stored in memory can become conscious
representations, i.e., become available to be used for the solution
of an actual problem (reaCog) or to be selected for a task (GNW).
In contrast, nonconsciously used representations can only be used
within their respective context.
To what extent can this aspect be represented by reaCog? If the
agent is performing an automatic behavior, in this case walking on
a not too strongly cluttered surface, the behavior can be driven by
direct (and therefore fast) application of local modules belonging
to the procedural memory. This is possible as long as no problem
occurs. In such situations, theWTA-net of the attention controller
is not activated which means that these behaviors are performed,
but not “cognitively attended.” Therefore, the procedures are acti-
vated but not element of Access Consciousness as they are not
used for planning, for example. However, when a problem hap-
pens to occur, most elements of the procedural memory can,
in principle, be accessed by the attention system (Norman and
Shallice, 1986). In reaCog this refers to those procedural elements
that receive an influence from the WTA units (Figure 4, dashed
arrows). Recall that, due to the properties of the WTA-net, only
one such element can be activated at a given moment of time.
All these modules may therefore be described as being “globally
accessible” and possible elements of Access Consciousness.
Relation between conscious and automatic procedures
There is another interesting relation between properties of reaCog
and findings in psychology, but has, to our knowledge not yet
been addressed by the GNW approach. On a qualitative level it is
known for long that we can learn new behaviors by treating them
consciously, but with time of practice we are able to perform these
behaviors more and more without conscious awareness being
necessary (sometimes dubbed “downloading into the amphibian
brain”). A similar process can be observed to happen in reaCog:
as long as learning a new solution has not yet reached a level
where no significant errors occur, the problem detectors are still
active and the corresponding behavior remains attended. If learn-
ing was successful, attention is not any more necessary and the
new solution has become part of the procedural memory, i.e., of
the reactive system5.
On the other hand, there are experimental results showing
that, in human beings, conscious access to an element after learn-
ing has been finished may lead to problems. Beilock et al. (2002)
have shown that well-trained athletes perform better when they
are distracted from the task than when they concentrate on per-
forming a well-trained behavior. In principle, this property could
be found in reaCog, too. If a WTA unit of the attention controller
is activated by any higher-level brain structures (not addressed
in Figure 4), this influence may activate learning and therefore
change, and possibly deteriorate, the properties of the neuronal
module. If no such attention influence is active, the behavior may
be performed in a perfect way.
Localizing access consciousness
Finally, another difference between the simulation studies of, on
the one hand, Dehaene and colleagues and Baars and colleagues
and, on the other hand, reaCog, should be addressed. Whereas in
the former approaches activities accompanied with consciousness
are assigned to specific areas of the human brain, we stay neu-
tral with respect to analogies between the structures of reaCog
and the morphology of the human brain due to our extreme
reduction to function. Instead, we could ask whether it would
be possible to localize the properties of Access Consciousness
anywhere within reaCog? Interestingly, there is no specific part
that might be attributed the property of Access Consciousness.
Rather, the complete system consisting of procedural memory,
the attention controller, and its ability to switch the motor out-
put from controlling the body to controlling the body model,
can be considered to correspond to the structure required for
Access Consciousness or the “neural workspace.” Its dynamics, as
defined by Dehaene and Naccache (2001), is, in the model, essen-
tially determined by the dynamics of the WTA-net. In our model
the neural workspace does not form a separate “theater” where
the content of the memory elements is re-represented. Instead,
5we have not yet implemented the learning procedure in reaCog.
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already existing modules of the procedural memory being cou-
pled via the loop through the model of the body and of the envi-
ronment together form the global workspace (which compares
to the notion of “second-order embodiment,” c.f. (Metzinger,
forthcoming). reaCog is neither hierarchically structured nor is it
strictly parallel, as the attention controller only selects the relevant
processes. Therefore, reaCog should not be interpreted as a first-
order model as defined by Lau and Rosenthal (2011), because the
upper layer, the attention controller, is necessarily required.
Attention and consciousness
Koch and Tsuchiya (2007) argue that there is attention without
consciousness and consciousness without concurrent attention,
which leads these authors to the conclusion that both phenom-
ena result from different mechanisms. This statement, of course,
depends on how attention and consciousness are defined. If we
accept a hypothesis for phenomenal experience to be based on
specific neuronal dynamics, and the proposal made by reaCog
that a stimulus is attended if specific motivation units are acti-
vated, in reaCog both phenomena are, although functionally
related, indeed subject to different mechanisms. Attention refers
to the selection of the procedure, which may reach a conscious
state if attended for long enough time.
METACOGNITION
The second, according Block (1995, 2001) and Cleeremans
(2005), essential domain of consciousness, Metacognition, or
Reflexive Consciousness (sometimes called Metarepresentation),
is characterized by Lau and Rosenthal (2011) as “cognition that
is about another cognitive process as opposed to about objects in
the world6.”
Thus, when focusing on phenomenality, Metacognition can
be described as referring to our ability not only to experience,
but also to experience that we are experiencing. Correspondingly,
when focusing on the execution of behavior, Metacognition refers
to the ability of the metacognitive agent to select procedures to
control behavior and, by doing so, representing himself or herself
(“I make the decision”). In other words, Metacognition requires
the ability to observe the own internal states from “above,” or
“from a bird’s eye perspective.” Metzinger (forthcoming) classi-
fies this ability as third order embodiment, where the own body is
“explicitly represented as existing” and the “body as a whole” can
turn “into an object of self-directed attention.” Cognitive systems
like reaCog can mentally manipulate only objects of the world,
including parts of their own body. These objects are manipulated
relative to themselves, i.e., in an egocentric world. In contrast,
a metacognitive system can, in addition, manipulate a repre-
sentation of itself relative to the other objects. In other words,
metacognitive systems can consider themselves as an object of the
world, an ability which may be described as allowing for an allo-
centric view. reaCog is not equipped with this ability, i.e., reaCog
is not equipped with Metacognition.
On a more detailed level, a metacognitive system is character-
ized by being able to exploit information concerning the quality
6Here, the term cognition is used in a more general way compared to the strict
definition proposed by McFarland and Bösser (1993) and used in this article.
of the procedure, for instance when selecting a procedure to con-
trol the behavior. A person may, for example, access their internal
states and guess to what extent he or she is sure about a specific
memory content, in order to use this knowledge for decisionmak-
ing. Exploiting stored confidence values is, as such, also possible
for a system like reaCog, for example, when the activation of a
motivation unit depends on a confidence or quality value. This is
indeed the case for the network Navinet mentioned above, which
is able to control ant-like navigation allowing for decisions on
memory retrieval which depend on the salience of the stored stim-
ulus (Cruse and Wehner, 2011; Hoinville et al., 2012). However,
reaCog, extended by Navinet, is not able to represent itself as an
element that is mentally manipulable as are other objects of the
world, for example its legs. Cleeremans et al. (2007) describe an
artificial neural network consisting of two networks. One, a first-
order network, learns a specific input-output task, whereas the
other, second-order network learns to estimate the quality of the
performance of the first network. The authors claim this system to
show a limited form of Metarepresentation, because it represents
not only knowledge in the system, but also knowledge for the sys-
tem. Although being a very interesting result, we are hesitating to
attribute such a system Metacognition as it lacks, like reaCog, a
representation of itself.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Thus, as a short summary, some of the properties attributed to
Access Consciousness can be found in our network, at least in a
basic form. Clearly missing are the ability of linguistic reasoning,
whereas introduction of verbal communication is only sketched.
reaCog may therefore be considered a system that could pro-
vide a scaffold for a later system being able to cover some basic
aspects of consciousness concerning both Access Consciousness
and, as addressed above, Metacognition as long as we put aside
the subjective aspect.
The question as to whether it is allowed after all to apply
the term consciousness, but also terms as attention, volition,
intention (and, not addressed here, emotion) to a simple, insect-
based artificial system could be answered in two ways: either
these terms are defined as to be strictly coupled to a system
that is known to be endowed with an internal perspective. Then,
according to current knowledge, these terms are only applica-
ble to human beings, because only in this case we have direct
evidence for phenomenality to exist. If we, however, leave this
condition open, we have to focus on the functional aspect, and
search for corresponding properties also in systems other than
human beings including artificial systems. This approach is pos-
sible because we believe that the phenomenal aspect is always
coupled to specific, yet unknown, properties of the neuronal sys-
tem which, at the same time, has functional effects and shows
subjective experience. In other words, adopting a monist view,
we assume that we can circumvent the “hard” problem, i.e., the
question concerning the subjective aspect of mental phenomena
without losing information concerning the possible function. Of
course, we are not in a position to claim which of these structures,
if any, are accompanied with phenomenality. If, however, the
function of the, for example artificial system, would indeed cor-
respond well enough to those of the neuronal structures that are
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accompanied with phenomenality, the artificial system may have
this property, too.
Following these arguments, we have presented a network that is
based on a decentralized architecture consisting of procedural, or
reactive, elements. The reactive network consisting of two subnets,
Walknet and Navinet, characterized by a heterarchical structure,
allows for selection of different behaviors, which includes pro-
tection against, in the current behavioral context, non-relevant
sensory input, thus representing a kind of implicit attention con-
trol. As a next “evolutionary” step the network is equipped with
a flexible internal body model allowing for internal simulation
of behaviors. Together with the introduction of an attention con-
troller, the complete network, termed reaCog, comprises the ability
to plan ahead and to invent new behaviors in order to solve prob-
lems for which no solution is actually available. This capability
allows the system to test possible adaptations of behavior by inter-
nal simulation before carrying them out in reality. In this way the
system may circumvent hazardous situations. As such, this atten-
tion system cannot function by itself, but only, like a parasite,
operates on top of the reactive structures. Following the defini-
tion of McFarland and Bösser (1993), the network, being based on
reactive procedures and being capable of planning ahead, can be
termed a cognitive system, giving rise to its name reaCog.
The architecture applied here integrates often discussed prop-
erties postulated to exist in neuronal systems, as are modularity,
heterarchy, redundancy, cross modal influences (e.g., path inte-
gration and landmark navigation in Navinet), bottom-up and
top-down attention control, i.e., selection of relevant input data
establishing priorities, as well as application of internal models for
prediction. The heterarchical structure used in reaCog comprises
a simple realization of “neural reuse” as proposed in Anderson’s
(2010) massive redeployment hypothesis (2010). Due to the fact
that some central structures as the motivation unit network and
the body model are realized as a RNN, the complete network
forms a holistic system.
This architecture provides an example showing that functional
concatenation of modules required for the control of complex
behavior does not necessarily require explicit coding, but may
emerge from local rules and the coupling through the environ-
ment. The latter is illustrated by implementing the network in
a, as a first step, dynamic simulation of a 2 DoF, wheeled robot
(Navinet) and a 22 DoF hexapod robot. In a second step, its capa-
bilities will be tested on the physical robot Hector (Schneider
et al., 2011).
In this article, we particularly focus on the question to what
extent aspects of consciousness may be attributed to this system
and in which way consciousness may allow for the control of
action? Following Block (1995) and Cleeremans (2005), there are
two functional aspects of consciousness, Access Consciousness,
and Metacognition, when we, as argued above, leave Phenomenal
Consciousness aside.
One function of Access Consciousness, as discussed here, is to
allow the agent becoming independent of the hard-wired reactive
structure by which memory elements can only be selected within
a given context. This is, for instance, required if a behavioral prob-
lem occurs, i.e., a situation not treatable by the existing system. In
the state of Access Consciousness, the agent is able to plan ahead,
and thereby to test new ideas, i.e., new combinations of elements
of the procedural memory. These new ideas, when successfully
tested by internal simulation, are used to guide the newly invented
behavior.
The advantages for an agent endowed with properties of Access
Consciousness come with drawbacks: (i) Controlling behaviors
through a conscious state is slower than controlling it by reactive
structures. (ii) Application of consciousness allows for invent-
ing new behaviors, but, when being activated during an ongoing
reactively controlled action, might worsen the performance. Both
properties can also be found in psychological experiments with
human participants.
The architecture used here, that allows to control behavior and
endorses properties of Access Consciousness, may also be suited
to set the stage for the later introduction of neural structures that
can function as neural representation of – averbal and verbal –
concepts. However, here we concentrated on a specific domain,
solving motor problems. Such problems cover an area being less
restricted than it might seem to be the case at a first glance, as
many problems, including abstract mathematical problems, can
arguably be understood as being based on the ability to solve
motor tasks (e.g., Lakoff and Núñez, 2000; Glenberg and Gallese,
2012). In addition to being concerned with motor control, reaCog
might be confronted with situations that might be seen as to
belong to perception and where attention may not be driven by
the WTA system of the “attention controller.” For instance, an
unexpected stimulus may, in a bottom-up fashion, direct atten-
tion to a memory element that represents this kind of stimulus.
Similarly, top-down attention is possible. The latter would how-
ever require further structures to represent the above mentioned
averbal or verbal concepts not yet introduced in reaCog.
Another aspect, not covered by the simple structure of reaCog,
concerns incubation (Helie and Sun, 2010). Incubation might
help when a problem is given for which actually no solution can
be found. A sensible way out of such a deadlock might be to
quit the current goal and introduce another one. As for the sim-
ple version of reaCog discussed here, internal simulation is only
possible whilst the actual behavior is interrupted, switching the
goal means that the problem as such would remain unsolved.
Incubation describes the observation that humans, in contrast to
reaCog, can apparently search for solutions even if other behav-
iors are active. Thus, a further challenge is to introduce structures
that allow searching for solutions of open problems, whilst the
agent is performing other behaviors.
Apart from such specific shortcomings that arise when trying
to compare a simple system like reaCog with fully conscious sys-
tems as humans, a more general counterargument might be to
consider Block’s conceptualizations that we use here as a scaffold
for helping to understand consciousness, as basically misguided.
Following this view, properties of reaCog might still be consid-
ered interesting, but of minor relevance for the discussion of what
is meant by consciousness. One specific case is represented by
authors who, as reviewed by Lau and Rosenthal (2011) restrict
consciousness to Metacognition only, and are not prepared to
attribute properties of consciousness to what is termed Access
Consciousness by other authors. This view represents a challenge
to expand reaCog for endorsing properties of Metacognition.
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Metacognition, or reflexive Cognition, addresses the ability to
deal with own mental states. A related aspect has been described
by the term Theory of Mind, which characterizes the ability to
attribute mental states (e.g., emotional states) also to other agents
(Premack and Woodruff, 1978). This has often be described as
the ability to “step into the shoes of the other.” In classical exper-
iments, this capability is tested in the so-called Sally–Anne task.
Two subjects are shown that a candy lying on the table is hidden
under a black cover. Then one subject, Sally, has to leave the room
whilst the candy is now hidden under the white cover, as observed
by Anne. After Sally has come back, Anne is asked under which
cover Sally will probably search for the candy. If Anne points to
the black cover, she is assumed to have a Theory of Mind, but
not, if she points to the white cover where the candy really is
placed. Being endowed with the faculty of applying a Theory of
Mind would allow to better model the world when it contains
not only mere physical objects but other agents capable of oper-
ating with not directly observable plans and intentions. Thus, the
ability to attribute a Theory of Mind, or mental states, to others
allows the agent to better predict the behavior of the other. Two
main alternative explanations are discussed as to how Theory of
Mind is realized. The so-called theory–theory (Carruthers, 1996)
assumes that there are (innate) procedures that allow for predic-
tion of others. In contrast, simulation theory (Goldman, 2005)
assumes that the agent has an internal model of him or herself that
can be used to represent the other, too. Via internal simulation
(or “probehandeln”), this model can simulate the behavior of
the other agent, based on the properties of the simulating agent.
However, both theories are not necessarily excluding each other.
If we assume that reaCog is expanded by a network that allows to
use its own body model to represent another agent (see Cruse and
Schilling, 2011) for a sketch of how such a network may be con-
structed), this model could be used for the simulation. If such
a simulation has led to a new, successful interpretation of the
behavior of the other, the result could be stored as a procedure,
as described for reaCog when having learnt new solutions. In this
way, the simulation result could be stored as part of the reactive
memory complementing the already existing innate procedures.
In this way, the structure allowing for internal simulation may
provide a tool for enriching the procedures usable to predict the
behavior of others. In any case, the faculty to apply a Theory of
Mind is clearly beyond the ability of reaCog, which allows for an
egocentric view only.
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